An assurance case based regime requires a strong review element. Typically, one party is responsible for preparing the assurance case. Another party (the certification authority) is responsible for accepting the assurance case. Assurance cases are, by their nature, often subjective. The objective of assurance case development, therefore, is to obtain mutual acceptance of this subjective position. The move from less prescriptive standards to “goal-based” standards has both strengthened the need for assurance cases, and increased the required review capability of the acceptance authorities. This paper presents a structured approach to assurance case review – focusing primarily on helping to assess the level of assurance offered by the assurance case argument.
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