Multiwinner Rules with Variable Number of Winners

We consider voting rules for approval-based elections that select committees whose size is not predetermined. Unlike the study of rules that output committees with a predetermined number of winning candidates, the study of rules that select a variable number of winners has only recently been initiated. We first mention some scenarios for which such rules are applicable. Then, aiming at better understanding these rules, we study their computational properties and report on simulations regarding the sizes of their committees.

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