Computationally sound implementations of equational theories against passive adversaries

In this paper we study the link between formal and cryptographic models for security protocols in the presence of passive adversaries. In contrast to other works, we do not consider a fixed set of primitives but aim at results for arbitrary equational theories. We define a framework for comparing a cryptographic implementation and its idealization with respect to various security notions. In particular, we concentrate on the computational soundness of static equivalence, a standard tool in cryptographic pi calculi. We present a soundness criterion, which for many theories is not only sufficient but also necessary. Finally, to illustrate our framework, we establish the soundness of static equivalence for the exclusive OR and a theory of ciphers and lists.

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