Dual transitions from authoritarian rule : popular and electoral democracy in Nicaragua

The most recent wave of democratization in Latin America has generated guarded optimism regarding the prospects for democratic consolidation in the region. Even those convinced of the cyclical nature of regime change in Latin America have been moved to assert that the current "cycle" of democratization is unprecedented in its depth and duration and may be able to sustain itself in the long term.' The changes brought forth by these transitions have been significant: restoration of civil and political liberties, establishment of freely contested elections, and creation of new opportunities for political participation. Nonetheless, it is important to recognize the limitations of recent democratic transitions. In the first place, many of the transitions can be characterized as "elite-dominated" or "transitions from above." As Terry Karl points out, during these transitions "traditional rulers remain in control, even if pressured from below, and successfully use strategies of either compromise or force-or some mix of the two-to retain at least part of their power."2 In Brazil, for example, the unprecedented popular mobilization in early 1984 demanding direct elections threatened to evolve beyond the mediating control of political elites. Subsequently, opposition elites abandoned their principal demand and entered into direct negotiations with the military government, effectively marginalizing popular sectors in the process. From this point on, elites, both incumbent and opposition, dominated the transition to civilian rule; they focused their efforts on the consolidation of political democracy, while disregarding the imperatives of social and economic democracy.3 An important element in these "transitions from above" has been the role of negotiated pacts. Many scholars argue that their benefits in terms of democratic consolidation outweigh the costs involved. Evelyne Huber Stevens writes that 'economic elites need to be reassured that their vital interests will be protected under a democratic regime in order to keep them from trying to prevent an opening and undermine the system once it has been opened."4 Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter contend that one of the lessons of recent transitions from authoritarian rule is that the Left must accept two fundamental restrictions: "the property rights of the bourgeoisie are inviolable," and the armed forces' "institutional existence, assets, and hierarchy cannot be eliminated or seriously threatened. "' What these observers fail to see is that, despite the contributions pacts can make in furthering a transition from authoritarian rule, they may present important obstacles to the establishment and consolidation of democratic rule. In exploring the role of pacts in Brazil's transition, Frances Hagopian demonstrates how pacts enabled incumbent elites to retain significant political power in return for their support of democracy. This allowed the military to solidify its predominant position within the state and to preserve its institutional autonomy