Failure-aware kidney exchange

Most algorithmic matches in fielded kidney exchanges do not result in an actual transplant. In this paper, we address the problem of cycles and chains in a proposed match failing after the matching algorithm has committed to them. We show that failure-aware kidney exchange can significantly increase the expected number of lives saved (i) in theory, on random graph models; (ii) on real data from kidney exchange match runs between 2010 and 2012; (iii) on synthetic data generated via a model of dynamic kidney exchange. From the computational viewpoint, we design a branch-and-price-based optimal clearing algorithm specifically for the probabilistic exchange clearing problem and show that this new solver scales well on large simulated data, unlike prior clearing algorithms.

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