Is This Really Kneaded? Identifying and Eliminating Potentially Harmful Forms of Workplace Control*

In a large German bakery chain, many workers report negative perceptions of monitoring via checklists. We survey workers and managers about the value and time costs to all in-store checklists, leading the firm to randomly remove two of the most perceivedly time-consuming and low-value checklists in half of stores. Sales increase by 2-3% and store manager attrition substantially decreases. Mystery shopping indicates this occurs without a rise in workplace problems. Before random assignment, regional managers predict whether the treatment would be effective for each store they oversee. Ex post, beneficial effects of checklist removal are fully concentrated in stores where regional managers predict the treatment will be effective, reflecting substantial heterogeneity in returns that is well-understood by these upper managers. Effects of checklist removal do not appear to come from workers having more time for production, but rather due to improvements in employee trust and commitment. Following the RCT, the firm implemented firmwide reductions in monitoring, eliminating a checklist regarded as demeaning, but keeping a checklist that helps coordinate production.

[1]  C. Syverson,et al.  Managers and Productivity in Retail , 2023, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[2]  Alisa Tazhitdinova Increasing Hours Worked: Moonlighting Responses to a Large Tax Reform , 2017, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[3]  Simone Quercia,et al.  Bonus versus penalty: How robust are the effects of contract framing? , 2017, Journal of the Economic Science Association.

[4]  Steven Tadelis,et al.  Reputation and Feedback Systems in Online Platform Markets , 2016 .

[5]  E. Lazear,et al.  The Value of Bosses , 2012, Journal of Labor Economics.

[6]  T. Turner,et al.  Systematic review of safety checklists for use by medical care teams in acute hospital settings - limited evidence of effectiveness , 2011, BMC health services research.

[7]  L. Keele,et al.  A General Approach to Causal Mediation Analysis , 2010, Psychological methods.

[8]  James B. Rebitzer,et al.  Extrinsic Rewards and Intrinsic Motives: Standard and Behavioral Approaches to Agency and Labor Markets , 2010, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[9]  L. Keele,et al.  Identification, Inference and Sensitivity Analysis for Causal Mediation Effects , 2010, 1011.1079.

[10]  Steven D. Levitt,et al.  Was There Really a Hawthorne Effect at the Hawthorne Plant? An Analysis of the Original Illumination Experiments , 2009 .

[11]  Miriam Bruhn,et al.  In Pursuit of Balance: Randomization in Practice in Development Field Experiments , 2008 .

[12]  Wendelin Schnedler,et al.  Legitimacy of Control , 2007, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[13]  A. Falk,et al.  The hidden costs of control , 2006 .

[14]  T. Hubbard The Demand for Monitoring Technologies: The Case of Trucking , 2000 .

[15]  W. Bodmer Principles of Scientific Management , 1993, FASEB journal : official publication of the Federation of American Societies for Experimental Biology.

[16]  C. Jackson,et al.  Checklists and Worker Behavior: A Field Experiment , 2015 .

[17]  Eth,et al.  Monitoring , Motivation , and Management : The Determinants of Opportunistic Behavior in a Field Experiment , 2008 .

[18]  C. Davis-Stober,et al.  Empirical Analysis , 1998 .

[19]  Casey Ichniowski,et al.  The Effects of Human Resource Management Practices on Productivity: A Study of Steel Finishing Lines , 1997 .

[20]  Paul R. Milgrom,et al.  The Economics of Modern Manufacturing: Technology, Strategy, and Organization , 1990 .

[21]  Bengt Holmstrom,et al.  Moral Hazard and Observability , 1979 .