Strategic Guard Placement for Optimal Response to Alarms in Security Games (Extended Abstract)
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We introduce a Security Game with a single static guard that is supported by a number of spatially imperfect alarms. We model this setting with two non–cooperative games modeling two different strategic interactions between a Defender and an Attacker. In the first one the Defender has to respond to an activated alarm given its current position (Alarm–Response Game). In the second one, the Defender has to determine the best static placement from which undertakes any alarm response (Guard–Placement Game).
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