Regulatory risk, borderline legality, fraud and financial restatement

Purpose - Companies vary in their attitudes toward regulatory (ethics) risk. The purpose of this study is to assess how regulatory risk-averse, risk neutral and risk seeking companies employ distinct managerial risk and slack accumulation strategies and differ in their auditor scores and bankruptcy risk. Design/methodology/approach - The authors test their hypotheses using the GAO-assembled database of financial restatements that allows contrasting voluntary restaters (firms that restated without being prompted either by external auditors or the SEC) and forced restaters (firms requested to restate by the SEC or external auditors). The paper uses logistic regression for comparing different groups of firms to test the hypotheses. Findings - The results of the data analysis mostly supported the hypotheses. The findings suggest that a firm's attitude towards regulatory risk is associated with organizational slack (available and potential), risk (managerial and organizational), and auditor's rating. Research limitations/implications - Some limitations of the study are: use of cross sectional data does not allow testing causal effects, relying on GAO office for categorizing firms in different regulatory category introduces the possibility of bias in analysis, and use of only North American firms in the sample limits the generalizability of the findings. Practical implications - Firms' attitudes toward regulatory risk and their respective risk and slack management strategies could be used to detect fraud early on before such firms transgress from the realm of legality to borderline legality and illegality. Originality/value - Some contributions of the study are: it shows that a firm's fraud tendency or regulatory risk behavior is associated with the type of slack accumulated and available in the firm, regulatory risk-averse companies take less managerial and bankruptcy risks, and earn higher evaluations from auditors, it demonstrates that regulatory risk-averse companies differ from regulatory risk neutral companies.

[1]  L. Gómez-Mejia,et al.  A Behavioral Agency Model of Managerial Risk Taking , 1998 .

[2]  L. Bourgeois On the Measurement of Organizational Slack , 1981 .

[3]  E. Johnsen Richard M. Cyert & James G. March, A Behavioral Theory of The Firm, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1963, 332 s. , 1964 .

[4]  J. H. Davis,et al.  TOWARD A STEWARDSHIP THEORY OF MANAGEMENT , 1997 .

[5]  Xiaomeng Zhang,et al.  Coming Forward: The Effects of Social and Regulatory Forces on the Voluntary Restatement of Earnings Subsequent to Wrongdoing , 2008, Organ. Sci..

[6]  Hemang Desai,et al.  The Reputational Penalty for Aggressive Accounting: Earnings Restatements and Management Turnover , 2004 .

[7]  Carol M. Sánchez,et al.  CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CORPORATE ILLEGALITY: THE EFFECTS OF BOARD STRUCTURE ON ENVIRONMENTAL VIOLATIONS , 1996 .

[8]  Jonathan M. Karpoff,et al.  The Consequences to Managers for Financial Misrepresentation , 2008 .

[9]  Melissa S. Baucus,et al.  Pressure, Opportunity and Predisposition: A Multivariate Model of Corporate Illegality , 1994 .

[10]  Eugene Szwajkowski,et al.  Organizational Illegality: Theoretical Integration and Illustrative Application , 1985 .

[11]  M. C. Jensen,et al.  THEORY OF THE FIRM: MANAGERIAL BEHAVIOR, AGENCY COSTS AND OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE , 1976 .

[12]  A. Tversky,et al.  Prospect Theory : An Analysis of Decision under Risk Author ( s ) : , 2007 .

[13]  John A. Wagner,et al.  Motive, Opportunity, Choice, and Corporate Illegality , 1997 .

[14]  P. Bromiley Testing a Causal Model of Corporate Risk Taking and Performance , 1991 .

[15]  Michael L. Ettredge,et al.  How Do Restatements Begin? Evidence of Earnings Management Preceding Restated Financial Reports , 2010 .

[16]  Michael D. Pfarrer,et al.  CEOS ON THE EDGE: EARNINGS MANIPULATION AND STOCK-BASED INCENTIVE MISALIGNMENT , 2008 .

[17]  Emily S. Block,et al.  Why 'Good' Firms Do Bad Things: The Effects of High Aspirations, High Expectations and Prominence on the Incidence of Corporate Illegality , 2010 .

[18]  Catherine M. Dalton,et al.  A changing of the guard: executive and director turnover following corporate financial restatements , 2005 .

[19]  L. J. Bourgeois,et al.  Organizational Slack and Political Behavior Among Top Management Teams. , 1983 .

[20]  Richard L. Priem,et al.  Top Management Team Characteristics and Corporate Illegal Activity , 1995 .

[21]  A. Tversky,et al.  Prospect theory: analysis of decision under risk , 1979 .

[22]  Timothy B. Palmer,et al.  Decoupling risk taking from income stream uncertainty: a holistic model of risk , 1999 .

[23]  Koen Vanhoof,et al.  Internal Fraud Risk Reduction - Results of a Data Mining Case Study , 2010, ICEIS.

[24]  Barry M. Staw,et al.  The scarcity-munificence component of organizational environments and the commission of illegal acts / 230 , 1975 .

[25]  Timothy G. Pollock,et al.  The Role of Power and Politics in the Repricing of Executive Options , 2002 .

[26]  Judy K. Land CEO turnover around earnings restatements and fraud , 2010 .

[27]  Edward H. Bowman,et al.  A risk/return paradox for strategic management , 2011 .

[28]  G. George Slack Resources and the Performance of Privately Held Firms , 2005 .

[29]  Barry M. Staw,et al.  Threat-rigidity effects in organizational behavior: A multilevel analysis. , 1981 .

[30]  Justin Tan,et al.  Organizational Slack and Firm Performance During Economic Transitions: Two Studies from an Emerging Economy , 2003 .

[31]  Jitendra V. Singh Performance, Slack, and Risk Taking in Organizational Decision Making , 1986 .