Inclusion of the shadow prices for natural gas in a dynamic fuels model for the United States shows that the primary reason for the relatively large, fly-up in new marginal gas prices in the early 1980's was the release of the pent-up price effects of the U.S. government's price regulations. In accordance with principles, the shadow price of natural gas fell siginificantly following de-regulation of the highcost gas (section 107) in 1980, which represented the precursor for downward adjustments in marginal wellhead prices of new high-cost gas and drilling activity. The modeling results show that no significant fly-up in new marginal gas prices for lower-cost gas (section 102) is likely to occur in 1985, when its phased de-regulation ends and it is finally de-regulated, because no shadow price precursor currently exists for this gas. Shadow price principles clear up the primary misconceptions with regard to natural gas pricing. This application indicates the significance of shadow price principles for regulated pricing in general.
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