Preference Aggregation in the Generalised Unavailable Candidate Model
暂无分享,去创建一个
Nicolas Maudet | Patrice Perny | Paolo Viappiani | Arnaud Grivet Sébert | P. Viappiani | P. Perny | N. Maudet | A. G. Sébert
[1] Sven Berg,et al. On probability models in voting theory , 1994 .
[2] M. Jackson,et al. Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures , 2001 .
[3] Craig Boutilier,et al. The unavailable candidate model: a decision-theoretic view of social choice , 2010, EC '10.
[4] Olivier Spanjaard,et al. Beyond Pairwise Comparisons in Social Choice: A Setwise Kemeny Aggregation Problem , 2020, AAAI.
[5] Matthew O. Jackson,et al. Voting by Successive Elimination and Strategic Candidacy , 2002, J. Econ. Theory.
[6] Miguel A. Ballester,et al. A Measure of Rationality and Welfare , 2015, Journal of Political Economy.
[7] Meir Kalech,et al. Reducing preference elicitation in group decision making , 2016, Expert Syst. Appl..
[8] Maria Polukarov,et al. New Results on Equilibria in Strategic Candidacy , 2013, SAGT.
[9] Jerry R. Green,et al. Assent-maximizing social choice , 2013, Soc. Choice Welf..
[10] Christian Klamler,et al. A distance measure for choice functions , 2008, Soc. Choice Welf..
[11] Yann Chevaleyre,et al. New Candidates Welcome! Possible Winners with respect to the Addition of New Candidates , 2011, Math. Soc. Sci..
[12] Jean-François Laslier,et al. And the Loser Is… Plurality Voting , 2012 .