Domain expansion of the pivotal mechanism

We propose a mechanism for the provision of public goods called the extended pivotal mechanism, which works on wider environments than quasi-linear ones. This mechanism is shown to be a natural extension of the pivotal (Clarke) mechanism because the restriction of the mechanism to the quasi-linear domain coincides with the pivotal mechanism, and because it is the only mechanism satisfying strategy-proofness, an efficient condition (partial efficiency), and an equity condition (the welfare lower bound property), which characterize the pivotal mechanism.

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