Free riding and the provision of candy bars

This paper uses Canadian data to study the relationship between sterilisation and the work careers of women. The study is motivated by the observation that childbearing and child rearing are the main reasons for the intermittency of womens ’work. Sterilisation may be correlated with a change in the labour market behaviour of women because it ends childbearing.There are three main findings. First, among women with children, sterilised women are more likely to work than non-sterilised women. Second,being sterilised is found to have a positive and significant effect on the earnings of women who had stopped working in the past but has an insignifican effect on the earnings of continuously employed women.Third,sterilised women and non-sterilised women do not differ in the probability that they had previously stopped working.However,among sterilised women who are currently working, most had experienced career interruptions that were initiated and completed before they became sterilised.

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