Defeasible Reasoning

What philosophers call defeosible reasoning is roughly the same OS nonmonotonic reasoning in Al. Some brief remarks ore mode about the nature of reasoning and the relationship between work in epistemology, Al, and cognitive psychology. This is followed by a general description of human rotionol architecture. This description has the consequence that defeasible reasoning has o more complicoted structure than has generally been recognized in Al. We define a proposition to be worronfed if it would be believed by on ideal reasoner. A general theory of warrant, based on defeasible reasons. is developed. This theory is then used osa guide in the construction of o theory of defeosible reasoning, and (I computer program implementing that theory. The theory constructed deals with only o subset of defeosible reasoning, but it is an important subset.

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