CryptoPage: An Efficient Secure Architecture with Memory Encryption, Integrity and Information Leakage Protection

Several secure computing hardware architectures using memory encryption and memory integrity checkers have been proposed during the past few years to provide applications with a tamper resistant environment. Some solutions, such as Hide, have also been proposed to solve the problem of information leakage on the address bus. We propose the CryptoPage architecture which implements memory encryption, memory integrity protection checking and information leakage protection together with a low performance penalty (3% slowdown on average) by combining the counter mode of operation, local authentication values and Merkle trees

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