Naval Forces and Civil-Military Relations

While the importance of navies for international affairs is widely documented, their influence in domestic politics remains less well understood. This research offers the first comparative account of how states? naval forces affect civil-military relations. Does the navy matter for military attempts to seize government power? The urban population and, especially, middle class elements in the capital city are potentially more capable (if willing) to create the conditions for the armed forces to overthrow the government. Because naval forces are more strongly linked to these societal elements due to recruitment practice and the location of their bases, countries with a larger navy in relation to the army could be more likely to see coups d?�tat. The empirical findings, based on the analysis of time-series cross-section data on a sample of all states between 1970 and 2007, provide strong support for the theory. Several robustness checks further increase the confidence in the results.

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