Game Theory and Human Behavior: Challenges in Security and Sustainability

Security and sustainability are two critical global challenges that involve the interaction of many intelligent actors. Game theory provides a sound mathematical framework to model such interactions, and computational game theory in particular has a promising role to play in helping to address key aspects of these challenges. Indeed, in the domain of security, we have already taken some encouraging steps by successfully applying game-theoretic algorithms to real-world security problems: our algorithms are in use by agencies such as the US coast guard, the Federal Air Marshals Service, the LAX police and the Transportation Security Administration. While these applications of game-theoretic algorithms have advanced the state of the art, this paper lays out some key challenges as we continue to expand the use of these algorithms in real-world domains. One such challenge in particular is that classical game theory makes a set of assumptions of the players, which may not be consistent with real-world scenarios, especially when humans are involved. To actually model human behavior within game-theoretic framework, it is important to address the new challenges that arise due to the presence of human players: (i) human bounded rationality; (ii) limited observations and imperfect strategy execution; (iii) large action spaces. We present initial solutions to these challenges in context of security games. For sustainability, we lay out our initial efforts and plans, and key challenges related to human behavior in the loop.

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