New paradigm psychology of reasoning: An introduction to the special issue edited by Elqayam, Bonnefon, and Over

The new paradigm in psychology of reasoning is becoming increasingly established. In this editorial to the special issue of Thinking & Reasoning we introduce the paradigm and explore some of its dimensions. The old paradigm focused on binary truth and truth preservation from assumptions, whereas the new paradigm puts subjective degrees of belief centre stage, represented as probabilities. Subjective psychological value, or utility, and social pragmatics also play a central role. Dual process theories provide the algorithmic-level underpinning to these computational-level functions. The new paradigm aims to integrate the psychology of reasoning with study of judgement and decision making, leading to a much more unified field of higher mental processing.

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