论文信息 - A Mechanism for Eliciting Probabilities

A Mechanism for Eliciting Probabilities

This paper describes a direct revelation mechanism for eliciting agents' subjective probabilities. The game induced by the mechanism has a dominant strategy equilibrium in which the players reveal their subjective probabilities. Copyright 2009 The Econometric Society.

Edi Karni | E. Karni

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