Arbitrated multiparty protocol

Assume that several people wish to have a meeting. For this to happen, they usually have to meet somewhere. If they cannot meet physically, then they can take part in a video (or audio) conference to discuss whatever needs to be discussed. But what if their meeting is meant to be private? In this case they need a cryptographic protocol that allows them to exchange their ideas remotely, while keeping them secure from any potential eavesdropper. In this paper we list all the necessary requirements that a cryptographic protocol must have in order to allow several persons to exchange their ideas securely over the Internet. Moreover, and based on the standard taxonomy of cryptographic protocols, we suggest several approaches on how to design cryptographic protocols that enable us to achieve our aim. Finally, we propose the design of a protocol that solves our problem.

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