Other Games on Static Complex Networks

In the last chapter, we have been discussing in some detail the dynamics and microscopical organization of the the so-called weak Prisoner’s Dilemma Game [1] on static complex networks, where the payoff for a cooperator against a defector was fixed to \(S=0\) (strictly speaking, for this value of \(S\), we are really at the border between the Prisoner’s Dilemma game and the Hawks and Doves -HD- game). In this chapter we want to address very briefly the issue of other evolutionary games on graphs.

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