Human Adversaries in Opportunistic Crime Security Games : How Past success ( or failure ) affects future behavior
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Milind Tambe | Arunesh Sinha | Chao Zhang | Nicole D. Sintov | Nicole Sintov | Milind Tambe | Chao Zhang | Arunesh Sinha | Yasaman Abbasi | Yasaman Dehghani Abbasi | Martin
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