Network investment, access and competition

This paper analyzes the role of different contract types and access regulation on innovation and competition in telecommunications in the context of Next Generation Access Networks. Within a standard duopoly model, it is shown that ex-post access contracts lead less often to the duplication of investment, but to a wider roll-out compared to a market in which such contracts cannot be offered. In comparison to such ex-post contracts, ex-ante contracts lead to an even wider roll-out, but to a less frequent duplication of investments. Ex-ante contracts in particular, but also ex-post contracts, can be used to dampen competition.

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