Intentional introductions of nonindigenous species: a principal-agent model and protocol for revocable decisions

Abstract Alien or genetically altered species, purposefully released to generate various benefits, may contribute to unanticipated damage to the delicate balance of an existing ecosystem. In an ideal world, harm can be avoided in either of two ways: (1) perfect ex ante information would allow the choice of only beneficial releases; and (2) perfect revocability would allow ex post revocation of any release that turned out to be harmful. Currently, standard decision protocols regulating releases depend heavily upon ex ante information, which is often costly and uncertain due to highly complex ecosystems. We propose a more balanced approach that combines imperfect ex ante information with imperfect revocability. A principal-agent model is used to address moral hazards affecting purposeful releases. A model protocol is sketched to implement the concepts developed in this paper, paying particular attention to incentives that encourage releasing agents, to provide the optimal degree of revocability.