Fiscal equalization and capitalization: Evidence from a policy reform

Fiscal equalization through the allocation of central government grants may have adverse distributional implications if these grants capitalize into house values. We investigate the impact of changes in grants induced by a reform of the Dutch grant system. Since this reform was implemented gradually and in two subsequent stages that targeted different policy domains, we are able to identify on the nonlinearity of its impact over time. As robustness checks, we identify on either stage separately, or on a reform of financing school buildings, which should have limited effects on house prices as additional funds came with an additional task for municipalities. Our results indicate full capitalization of grants. It follows that property owners were important beneficiaries in the municipalities that saw their grants increased because of disadvantageous socio-economic composition.

[1]  C. Hilber,et al.  The Economic Implications of House Price Capitalization: A Synthesis , 2015 .

[2]  F. Bos Economic theory and four centuries of fiscal decentralisation in the Netherlands , 2013 .

[3]  C. Hilber,et al.  The Impact of Supply Constraints on House Prices in England , 2013 .

[4]  C. Hilber,et al.  Capitalization of Central Government Grants into Local House Prices: Panel Data Evidence from England , 2011 .

[5]  David Albouy Evaluating the Efficiency and Equity of Federal Fiscal Equalization , 2010 .

[6]  Frédéric Robert-Nicoud,et al.  On the Origins of Land Use Regulations: Theory and Evidence from US Metro Areas , 2009 .

[7]  D. King,et al.  Less than you thought: The fiscal autonomy of sub-central governments , 2007 .

[8]  Saku Aura,et al.  Supply Constraints and Housing Prices , 2006, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[9]  C. Mayer,et al.  Why Do Households Without Children Support Local Public Schools? , 2004 .

[10]  C. Rouse,et al.  Using Market Valuation to Assess Public School Spending , 2002 .

[11]  W. Oates,et al.  An Essay on Fiscal Federalism , 1999 .

[12]  Ben Lockwood Inter-regional insurance , 1999 .

[13]  Stephen L. Ross,et al.  Chapter 47 Sorting and voting: A review of the literature on urban public finance , 1999 .

[14]  S. Bucovetsky Insurance and Incentive Effects of Transfers among Regions: Equity and Efficiency , 1997 .

[15]  G. Tabellini,et al.  Federal Fiscal Constitutions: Risk Sharing and Redistribution , 1996, Journal of Political Economy.

[16]  G. Tabellini,et al.  Federal Fiscal Constitutions: Risk Sharing and Moral Hazard , 1996 .

[17]  Helen F. Ladd,et al.  THE CASE FOR EQUALIZING AID , 1994, National Tax Journal.

[18]  Anwar M. Chaudry-Shah CAPITALIZATION AND THE THEORY OF LOCAL PUBLIC FINANCE: AN INTERPRETIVE ESSAY , 1988 .

[19]  F. Flatters,et al.  Efficiency and Equalization Payments in a Federal System of Government: A Synthesis and Extension of Recent Results , 1982 .

[20]  J. Brueckner A test for allocative efficiency in the local public sector , 1981 .