Efficient feasibility checking in reverse clock auctions for radio spectrum

We investigate the problem of building a feasibility checker to repack stations in the reverse auction part of the FCC’s ongoing, multi-billion-dollar “incentive auction”. In this work, we describe the design of a feasibility checker, SATFC, that has been adopted by the FCC for use in the incentive auction. We also construct a reverse auction simulator both in order to evaluate SATFC and also to gain insight into how the performance of the feasibility checker impacts the overall cost and efficiency of the auction. Through running simulations that differ only in the feasibility checker used, we show that the feasibility checker has a significant impact on auction cost and efficiency.

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