Optimal defense against election control by deleting voter groups
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Bo An | Yue Yin | Yevgeniy Vorobeychik | Noam Hazon | Bo An | Y. Vorobeychik | Yue Yin | Noam Hazon | Yevgeniy Vorobeychik
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