Verifying compliance to the biological and toxin weapons convention.

There are difficult technical problems inherent in verifying compliance to the Biological Weapons and Toxin Convention (BWC) that are making it difficult to reach international agreement on a verification protocol. A compliance regime will most likely involve the formation of an Organization for the Prevention of Biological Warfare (OPBW). Based in part on the experience of UNSCOM in Iraq, this article considers the value of establishing an OPBW and the problems that would be faced by such an international organization. It also reviews the types of verification measures that might be applied by the OPBW and their limitations and benefits for deterring biological weapons programs.

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