Dynamic, Private, Anonymous, Collateralizable Commitments vs. MEV

. We introduce DPACCs, a generalized commitment scheme based on smart contract wallets and non-interactive zero knowledge proofs. DPACCs allow any smart contract wallet holder to collateralize a claim, request, or commitment in general, in a private and anonymous manner. DPACCs can prove arbitrarily much or little about the wallet generating the commitment, and/or the transaction which is being committed. This can be used to convince a prospective block builder or relayer that the wallet generating the DPACC has enough funds to pay required fees, that the wallet is committed to performing certain actions, and importantly, that the wallet loses some amount of collateral if this commitment is broken. DPACCs delegate typically expensive zero knowledge operations off-chain, only requiring an additional one or two mapping checks when compared to transactions being sent from basic externally owned accounts. We demonstrate that DPACCs can be applied to effectively eliminate MEV in DeFi where it currently occurs, shifting MEV instead to censorship. Although still a concern, censorship can be made pro-hibitively expensive, making DPACCs a viable solution to most sources of MEV.

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