A comparative study on learning in a normal form game experiment

Abstract This paper reports the results of a predictive accuracy contest among a number of learning models using the experimental data reported in Tang (1999) . A class of reinforcement learning rules—the Harley models—emerge from the race as fitting the data set best.

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