Experience feedback from in-depth event investigations: How to find and implement efficient remedial actions

Abstract The present research focuses on the processes of identifying remedial actions subsequent to incidents at two Swedish nuclear power plants. Data from 106 in-depth analyses were analysed together with interviews with event investigators. The results and previous research in the domain indicated a need to further develop the process for identifying remedial actions. A method was developed that focuses on process descriptions and identifications of strengths and weaknesses inherent in the process(es) in which an incident occurred. The method uses a participatory approach with actors from the relevant process(es). A case study was conducted which showed promising results. The method is discussed in terms of generalising to a more process-oriented experience feedback than usually is applied.

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