Integrating mechanist 1 and nomological machine ontologies to make sense of what- how-that causal evidence 2

Consideration of contemporary practice suggests that scientists use a wide range of evidence in support of causal claims and causal inferences, often to convincing effect. Such evidence encompasses the arrangements of things which bring about causal change (what-evidence), the nature of the processes of such change (how-evidence), and the regularities which are brought about (that-evidence). Many philosophical accounts of causation, especially neo-Humean accounts, don’t seem to allow much of this evidence – their ontologies are too parsimonious. Mechanist accounts, especially the MDC 3 account, are a great advance in having the potential to admit the full range of what-how-that evidence, I shall argue. But these accounts are narrowly focused on stable mechanisms – development is required to broaden their area of application. Cartwright’s nomological machine ontology is much more widely applicable, underwriting causal regularities quite generally (Cartwright 1989; 1999), and this ontology too admits much causal evidence but here further development is required to admit evidence relating to the processes of causal change (how-evidence), I shall argue.