论文信息 - Strategic Ability Update: A Modal Logic Account

Strategic Ability Update: A Modal Logic Account

We study an update operator for Coalition Logic to talk about the way players' strategic ability changes because of the moves of their opponents. We show its connection with Dynamic Epistemic Logic and we apply it to reason about game theoretical notions like undominated choice.

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