论文信息 - Computational Improvements to Differential Side Channel Analysis

Computational Improvements to Differential Side Channel Analysis

The process of performing a Side Channel Attack is generally a computationally intensive task. By employing a number of simple optimisations the data analysis phase of the attack can be greatly improved. In this paper we will describe some of these improvements and show in the context of DES when attacked using Kocher’s classic DPA [1], that a 97% reduction in data processing can be achieved.

David Naccache | Michael Tunstall | Claire Whelan

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