The recently announced Energy Union by the European Commission is the most recent step in a series of developments aiming at integrating the EU's gas markets to increase social welfare (SW) and security of gas supply. Based on a spatial partial equilibrium model, we analyze the changes in consumption, prices, and SW up to 2022 induced by the infrastructure expansions planned for this period. We find that wholesale prices decrease slightly and converge at Western European levels, the potential of suppliers to exert market power decreases significantly, and consumer surplus increases by 15.9% in the EU. Our results allow us to distinguish three categories of projects: (i) New gas sources developed and brought to the EU markets. These projects decrease prices and increase SW in a large number of countries. The only project in this category is the Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline; (ii) Existing gas sources made available to additional countries. This leads to an increase of SW in the newly connected countries, and a decrease everywhere else. These projects mainly involve pipeline and regasification terminal capacity enhancements; (iii) Projects with a marginal effect on the (fully functioning) market. Most storage expansion projects fall into this category, plus the recently announced Turkish Stream. Our results indicate that if all proposed infrastructure projects are realized, the EU's single market will become a reality in 2019. However, we also find that SW can only be increased significantly for the EU as a whole if new gas sources become accessible. Consequently, we suggest that the EU should emphasize on measures to increase the available volumes, in particular once the integration of the market is completed. At the same time, efficiency gains, albeit decreasing SW, help to improve the situation of consumers and decrease the dependency of the EU as a whole on external suppliers.
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