论文信息 - Nash Equilibria from the Correlated Equilibria Viewpoint

Nash Equilibria from the Correlated Equilibria Viewpoint

We consider Nash equilibria as correlated equilibria and apply polyhedral theory to study extreme Nash equilibrium properties. We obtain an alternate proof that extreme Nash equilibria are extreme correlated equilibria and give some characteristics of them. Furthermore, we study a class of games that have no completely mixed Nash equilibria.

Pierre Hansen | Brigitte Jaumard | Sabrina Gomez Canovas | B. Jaumard | P. Hansen

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