Disclosure of endogenous information

We study the effect of disclosure requirements in environments where experts publicly acquire private information before engaging in a persuasion game with a decision maker. In contrast to settings where private information is exogenous, we show that disclosure requirements never change the set of equilibrium outcomes regardless of the players’ preferences.

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