Factors Affecting Concession Rate and Threat Usage in Bilateral Conflict

To test the reciprocity and level of aspiration hypotheses with respect to concession rate, this study utilized a bilateral negotiation paradigm involving coercive power capabilities. Subjects bargained against a confederate who followed a programmed strategy. Three independent variables (the confederate's concession rate, the subject's relative power position, and the confederate's punishment frequency) were manipulated in a 2 X 2 X 2 factorial design. When subjects occupied the strong power

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