Null, nullifying, or dummifying players: The difference between the Shapley value, the equal division value, and the equal surplus division value

We provide new characterisations of the equal surplus division value. This way, the difference between the Shapley value, the equal surplus division value, and the equal division value is pinpointed to one axiom.

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