Time, uncertainty, and subjectivism: Giving more body to law and economics

Abstract I have said that those modern economists classified as institutionalists express considerable dissatisfaction with what most economists have been doing, but, by and large, this dissatisfaction is not with the basic economic theory itself but with how it is used. The objection essentially is that the theory floats in the air. It is as if one studied the circulation of the blood without having a body. -R. H. Coase (1984)

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