Differentiating between Models of Perceptual Decision Making Using Pupil Size Inferred Confidence

During perceptual decisions, subjects often rely more strongly on early, rather than late, sensory evidence, even in tasks when both are equally informative about the correct decision. This early psychophysical weighting has been explained by an integration-to-bound decision process, in which the stimulus is ignored after the accumulated evidence reaches a certain bound, or confidence level. Here, we derive predictions about how the average temporal weighting of the evidence depends on a subject's decision confidence in this model. To test these predictions empirically, we devised a method to infer decision confidence from pupil size in 2 male monkeys performing a disparity discrimination task. Our animals' data confirmed the integration-to-bound predictions, with different internal decision bounds and different levels of correlation between pupil size and decision confidence accounting for differences between animals. However, the data were less compatible with two alternative accounts for early psychophysical weighting: attractor dynamics either within the decision area or due to feedback to sensory areas, or a feedforward account due to neuronal response adaptation. This approach also opens the door to using confidence more broadly when studying the neural basis of decision making. SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT An animal's ability to adjust decisions based on its level of confidence, sometimes referred to as “metacognition,” has generated substantial interest in neuroscience. Here, we show how measurements of pupil diameter in macaques can be used to infer their confidence. This technique opens the door to more neurophysiological studies of confidence because it eliminates the need for training on behavioral paradigms to evaluate confidence. We then use this technique to test predictions from competing explanations of why subjects in perceptual decision making often rely more strongly on early evidence: the way in which the strength of this effect should depend on a subject's decision confidence. We find that a bounded decision formation process best explains our empirical data.