Localization of Spoofing Devices using a Large-scale Air Traffic Surveillance System

Systems relying on satellite positioning techniques such as GPS can be targeted by spoofing attacks, where attackers try to inject fake positioning information. With the growing spread of flying drones and their usage of GPS for localization, these systems become interesting targets of attacks with the purpose of hijacking or to distract air safety surveillance. The most recent development in air traffic surveillance is the automatic dependent surveillance -- broadcast (ADS-B). Aircraft periodically broadcast their location, speed, or environmental measurements via ADS-B. The open research project OpenSky Network collects ADS-B reports and makes them available for research purposes. This poster presents a concept to detect and localize spoofing devices by utilizing the information provided by a large-scale air traffic surveillance system. We utilize ADS-B reports collected by the OpenSky Network and provide first results on the effectiveness of localizing spoofing sources.

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