Tests for Establishing Security Properties

Ensuring strong security properties in some cases requires participants to carry out tests during the execution of a protocol. A classical example is electronic voting: participants are required to verify the presence of their ballots on a bulletin board, and to verify the computation of the election outcome. The notion of certificate transparency is another example, in which participants in the protocol are required to perform tests to verify the integrity of a certificate log.

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