论文信息 - Rational choice and the Condorcet jury theorem

Rational choice and the Condorcet jury theorem

Abstract In a recent paper, Austen-Smith and Banks (1996,Amer. Polit. Sci. Rev.90, 34–45), criticize the current literature on the Condorcet jury theorem as neglecting the behavioral underpinnings of decision-making. They leave open the question whether allowing mixed strategies would sustain the conclusions of the Condorcet jury theorem. In this paper, it is shown that these conclusions can hold in equilibrium. In other words, “a rational choice foundation for the claim that majorities invariably ‘do better’ than individuals” is derived. (Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: D72.

Janny G. de Wit | J. G. Wit

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