Presidential Address: The Corporation in Finance

To produce significant net present value, an entrepreneur has to differentiate her enterprise from the ordinary. To take collaborators with her, she needs to have substantial ownership, and thus financing. But it is hard to raise finance against differentiated assets. So an entrepreneur has to commit to undertake a second transformation, standardization, that will make the human capital in the firm, including her own, replaceable, so that outside financiers obtain control rights that will allow them to be repaid. A vibrant stock market helps the entrepreneur commit to these two transformations. The nature of firms and financing are intimately linked. ONE OF THE CORNERSTONES of modern corporate finance is the Modigliani-Miller Theorem, which essentially says that, in a world where investors can borrow and lend as easily as corporations, the value of a firm is determined by the present discounted value of its expected cash flows, and not by how these cash flows are allocated to various claimholders. A firm's capital structure is therefore irrelevant to its value, or taken literally, much of what corporate finance spends its time on is of second-order importance. Corporate finance researchers have spent the years since Modigliani and Miller (1958) trying to prove the value of their field by challenging one as- sumption after another of the near-perfect world that Modigliani and Miller postulate. Modigliani and Miller themselves acknowledge the tax deductability of interest, which would imply that firm value should increase with leverage. Seminal contributions by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Myers (1977) show that capital structure choices affect the firm's investment decisions. These con- tributions have been followed by Myers and Majluf (1984), who suggest that information asymmetries between management and investors also influence the choice of securities that are issued, and hence corporate investment, and by Jensen (1986), who proposes that debt disciplines managerial waste. Corpo- rate finance has thus responded well to the challenge posed by Modigliani and

[1]  Amit Seru Firm Boundaries Matter: Evidence from Conglomerates and R&D Activity , 2010 .

[2]  Andrei Shleifer,et al.  Management entrenchment: The case of manager-specific investments , 1989 .

[3]  E. Fama,et al.  Agency Problems and Residual Claims , 1983 .

[4]  Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden,et al.  Short-Term versus Long-Term Interests: Capital Structure with Multiple Investors , 1994 .

[5]  D. Teece Profiting from technological innovation: Implications for integration, collaboration, licensing and public policy , 1993 .

[6]  R. Coase The Nature of the Firm , 1937 .

[7]  Patrick Bolton,et al.  Optimal Debt Structure and the Number of Creditors , 1996, Journal of Political Economy.

[8]  Jeffrey Zwiebel,et al.  Dynamic Capital Structure Under Managerial Entrenchment , 1995 .

[9]  S. Myers,et al.  Debt and Managerial Rents in a Real-Options Model of the Firm , 2007 .

[10]  P. Asquith,et al.  Equity issues and offering dilution , 1986 .

[11]  Shorey Peterson,et al.  The Modern Corporation and Private Property. , 1933 .

[12]  O. Williamson Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance , 1988 .

[13]  Paul R. Milgrom,et al.  Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design , 1991 .

[14]  Artur Raviv,et al.  The Theory of Capital Structure , 1991 .

[15]  Sheridan Titman,et al.  The effect of capital structure on a firm's liquidation decision☆ , 1984 .

[16]  A. Bhide,et al.  The Venturesome Economy: How Innovation Sustains Prosperity in a More Connected World , 2008 .

[17]  Manju Puri,et al.  Venture Capital and the Professionalization of Start-Up Firms: Empirical Evidence , 2000 .

[18]  O. Williamson The economic institutions of capitalism , 1985 .

[19]  D. Teece,et al.  How to Capture Value from Innovation: Shaping Intellectual Property and Industry Architecture , 2007 .

[20]  Josh Lerner,et al.  Contractibility and the Design of Research Agreements , 2004 .

[21]  B. Klein,et al.  Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process , 1978, The Journal of Law and Economics.

[22]  Manju Puri,et al.  The Interaction between Product Market and Financing Strategy: The Role of Venture Capital , 1999 .

[23]  M. C. Jensen,et al.  Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers , 1999 .

[24]  J. Schumpeter The Theory of Economic Development: An Inquiry into Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest, and the Business Cycle , 1934 .

[25]  E. Fama,et al.  The Theory of Finance , 1974 .

[26]  D. Scharfstein,et al.  The Dark Side of Internal Capital Markets: Divisional Rent-Seeking and Inefficient Investment , 1997 .

[27]  S. Myers Determinants of corporate borrowing , 1977 .

[28]  Raghuram G. Rajan,et al.  THE FIRM AS A DEDICATED : A THEORY OF THE ORIGINS AND GROWTH OF FIRMS ∗ , 2000 .

[29]  P. Bolton,et al.  A theory of predation based on agency problems in financial contracting , 1990 .

[30]  J. Lerner,et al.  Contractibility and Contract Design in Strategic Alliances , 2010 .

[31]  W. Peach The security affiliates of national banks , 1941 .

[32]  E. Fama,et al.  Separation of Ownership and Control , 1983, The Journal of Law and Economics.

[33]  Kathryn E. Spier,et al.  Capital Structure as a Bargaining Tool: The Role of Leverage in Contract Renegotiation , 1993 .

[34]  M. C. Jensen,et al.  Harvard Business School; SSRN; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Harvard University - Accounting & Control Unit , 1976 .

[35]  Rosabeth Moss Kanter,et al.  When giants learn to dance : mastering the challenges of strategy, management, and careers in the 1990s , 1992 .

[36]  A. Bhide The Origin and Evolution of New Businesses , 2000 .

[37]  O. Hart,et al.  Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm , 1988, Journal of Political Economy.

[38]  W. Dugger The Economic Institutions of Capitalism , 1987 .

[39]  Douglas W. Diamond,et al.  A Theory of Bank Capital , 1999 .

[40]  Jock Given,et al.  The venturesome economy: how innovation sustains prosperity in a more connected world , 2010 .

[41]  Bengt Holmstrom The Firm as a Subeconomy , 1999 .

[42]  Per Strömberg,et al.  Should Investors Bet on the Jockey or the Horse? Evidence from the Evolution of Firms from Early Business Plans to Public Companies , 2007 .

[43]  C. Pérez Technological revolutions and financial capital : the dynamics of bubbles and golden ages , 2003 .

[44]  John Roberts,et al.  The Boundaries of the Firm Revisited , 1998 .

[45]  E. Steen,et al.  Interpersonal Authority in a Theory of the Firm (This paper is currently being revised) , 2007 .

[46]  F. Knight The economic nature of the firm: From Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit , 2009 .

[47]  O. Hart,et al.  A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital , 1991 .

[48]  Lars Stole,et al.  Organizational Design and Technology Choice under Intrafirm Bargaining: Comment , 2003 .

[49]  D. Scharfstein,et al.  Internal Versus External Capital Markets , 1994 .

[50]  Merton H. Miller The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment , 1958 .

[51]  H. Demsetz,et al.  Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization , 1975, IEEE Engineering Management Review.

[52]  Charles W. Calomiris,et al.  American Economic Association The Role of Demandable Debt in Structuring Optimal Banking Arrangements , 2007 .

[53]  Luo Zuo,et al.  Shaped by Booms and Busts: How the Economy Impacts CEO Careers and Management Styles , 2011 .

[54]  R. Rajan,et al.  Saving Capitalism from the Capitalists , 2003 .

[55]  Kevin J. Murphy,et al.  Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm , 1997 .

[56]  Oliver Hart,et al.  A Theory of Firm Scope , 2002 .

[57]  J. Tirole The theory of corporate finance , 2006 .

[58]  Luigi Zingales,et al.  Power in a Theory of the Firm , 1996 .

[59]  Scott E. Masten,et al.  A Legal Basis for the Firm , 1988 .

[60]  Sanford J. Grossman,et al.  The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration , 1986 .

[61]  O. Williamson The Theory of the Firm as Governance Structure: From Choice to Contract , 2002 .

[62]  Douglas W. Diamond Debt Maturity Structure and Liquidity Risk , 1991 .

[63]  Reinier Kraakman,et al.  Law and the Rise of the Firm , 2006 .

[64]  Luigi Zingales,et al.  The great reversals: the politics of financial development in the twentieth century , 2003 .

[65]  T. Malone Is Empowerment Just a Fad? Control, Decision Making, and IT , 1997 .

[66]  H. Hansmann,et al.  The Ownership of Enterprise , 1996 .

[67]  David Thesmar,et al.  Optimal Dissent in Organizations , 2005 .

[68]  A. Shleifer,et al.  A Survey of Corporate Governance , 1996 .

[69]  Samuel Kortum,et al.  Assessing the Contribution of Venture Capital to Innovation , 2000 .

[70]  William G. Roy,et al.  Socializing Capital: The Rise of the Large Industrial Corporation in America , 1997 .

[71]  G. Ferri Essay Review on Raghuram G. Rajan and Luigi Zingales (2003), Saving Capitalism from the Capitalists, Random House, New York , 2006 .

[72]  Jeffrey Wurgler,et al.  Behavioral Corporate Finance: An Updated Survey , 2011 .

[73]  Per Strömberg,et al.  Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts , 2000 .

[74]  Andrei Shleifer,et al.  Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers , 1987 .

[75]  David M. Kreps Corporate culture and economic theory , 1990 .

[76]  Julie Wulf,et al.  The Flattening Firm: Evidence from Panel Data on the Changing Nature of Corporate Hierarchies , 2003, The Review of Economics and Statistics.

[77]  Robert S Gibbons Four Formal(Izable) Theories of the Firm? , 2004 .

[78]  Margaret M. Blair Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business Organizers in the Nineteenth Century , 2004 .

[79]  Raghuram G. Rajan,et al.  Liquidity Risk, Liquidity Creation, and Financial Fragility: A Theory of Banking , 1999, Journal of Political Economy.

[80]  O. Williamson,et al.  Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. , 1977 .

[81]  George P. Baker,et al.  Strategic Alliances: Bridges between "Islands of Conscious Power" , 2008 .

[82]  Bruce C. Petersen,et al.  Law, Stock Markets, and Innovation , 2012 .

[83]  V. Acharya,et al.  The Internal Governance of Firms , 2009 .

[84]  Andrei Shleifer,et al.  Liquidation Values and Debt Capacity: A Market Equilibrium Approach , 1992 .

[85]  R. Gilson,et al.  Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital Markets: Banks Versus Stock Markets , 1997 .

[86]  Eric Maskin,et al.  Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts , 1999 .

[87]  Paul Milgrom,et al.  The Firm as an Incentive System , 1994 .