A survey of belief revision and updating rules in various uncertainty models

The paper proposes a parallel survey of revision and updating operations available in the probability theory and in the possibility theory frameworks. In these two formalisms the current state of knowledge is generally represented by a [0,1]‐valued function whose domain is an exhaustive set of mutually exclusive possible states of the world. However, in possibility theory, the unit‐interval can be viewed as a purely ordinal scale. Two general kinds of operations can be defined on this assignment function: conditioning, and imaging (or “projection”). the difference between these two operations is analogous to the one made between belief revision à la Gärdenfors and updating à la Katsuno and Mendelzon in the logical framework. In the probabilistic framework these two operations are respectively Bayesian conditioning and Lewis' imaging. Counterparts to these operations are presented for the possibilistic framework including the case of conditioning upon uncertain observations, and justifications are given which parallel the ones existing for the probabilistic operations. More particularly, it is recalled that possibilistic conditioning satisfies all the postulates proposed by Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson for belief revision (stated in possibilistic terms), and it is proved that possibilistic imaging satisfies all the postulates proposed by Katsuno and Mendelzon. the situation where our current knowledge is stated in terms of weighted logical propositions is discussed in connection to possibility theory. Revision in other more complex numerical formalisms, namely belief and plausibility functions, and upper and lower probabilities is also surveyed. Recent results on the revision of conditional knowledge bases are also reviewed. the frameworks of belief functions, upper and lower probabilities and conditional bases are more sophisticated than the previous ones because they enable to distinguish between factual evidence and generic knowledge in a cognitive state. This, framework leads to two forms of belief revision respectively taking care of the revision of evidence and the revision of knowledge. © 1994 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

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