Game Theory and Accounting

[1]  James H. Case,et al.  Economics and the Competitive Process , 1979 .

[2]  Yair Tauman,et al.  A sufficient condition on ƒ for ƒ∘μ to be in pNAD , 1982 .

[3]  Daniel Granot,et al.  The Relationship Between Convex Games and Minimum Cost Spanning Tree Games: A Case for Permutationally Convex Games , 1982 .

[4]  M. Shubik.  Incentives, Decentralized Control, the Assignment of Joint Costs and Internal Pricing , 1962 .

[5]  Robert E. Verrecchia,et al.  A Unique Procedure For Allocating Common Costs From A Production Process , 1981 .

[6]  Andrew Whinston,et al.  Cost allocation for a regional wastewater treatment system , 1979 .

[7]  L. Shapley,et al.  On the Core of an Economic System with Externalities , 1969 .

[8]  W. Lucas,et al.  N‐person games in partition function form , 1963 .

[9]  Louis J. Billera,et al.  Allocation of Shared Costs: A Set of Axioms Yielding A Unique Procedure , 1982, Math. Oper. Res..

[10]  L. Telser,et al.  Competition, collusion, and game theory , 1972 .

[11]  Richard J. Giglio,et al.  Methods for apportioning costs among participants in regional systems , 1972 .

[12]  Joseph Raanan.  The Value of the Non-Atomic Game Arising from a Rate-Setting Application and Related Problems. , 1978 .

[13]  A. Schotter,et al.  Applied Game Theory , 1979, Physica-Verlag HD.

[14]  Martin Shubik.  Essays in Mathematical Economics, in Honor of Oskar Morgenstern , 1967 .

[15]  Andrew B. Whinston,et al.  Private good clubs and the core , 1978 .

[16]  W. Lucas.  Game Theory and Its Applications , 1982 .

[17]  Nimrod Megiddo,et al.  Cost allocation for steiner trees , 1978, Networks.

[18]  D. Schmeidler.  The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game , 1969 .

[19]  W. Sharkey.  Existence of Sustainable Prices for Natural Monopoly Outputs , 1981 .

[20]  J. McDonald.  The game of business , 1975 .

[21]  Andrew B. Whinston,et al.  Stable taxation schemes in regional environmental management , 1979 .

[22]  Norio Okada,et al.  Sharing Costs Fairly. A Practical Introduction to Cooperative Game Theory , 1981 .

[23]  G. Owen,et al.  A Simple Expression for the Shapley Value in a Special Case , 1973 .

[24]  M. Nakayama,et al.  The Cost Assignment of the Cooperative Water Resource Development: A Game Theoretical Approach , 1976 .

[25]  H. Young,et al.  Cost allocation in water resources development , 1982 .

[26]  S. C. Littlechild,et al.  Aircraft Landing Fees: A Game Theory Approach , 1977 .

[27]  Dov Samet,et al.  The Determination of Marginal-Cost Prices Under a Set of Axioms , 1982 .

[28]  Cost Allocation and Demand Revelation in Public Enterprises , 1980 .

[29]  Istvan Bogardi,et al.  Application of game theory in water management , 1976 .

[30]  Stephen Littlechild.  Common Costs, Fixed Charges, Clubs and Games , 1975 .

[31]  D. Gately.  Sharing the Gains from Regional Cooperation: A Game Theoretic Application to Planning Investment in Electric Power , 1974 .

[32]  Yair Tauman,et al.  Demand Compatible Equitable Cost Sharing Prices , 1982, Math. Oper. Res..

[33]  Andrew Whinston,et al.  A Generalized Cost Allocation Scheme , 1976 .

[34]  Andrew B. Whinston,et al.  A Theory of Pricing under Decreasing Costs , 1978 .

[35]  P. Ordeshook.  Game theory and political science , 1978 .

[36]  J. H. Grotte.  Observations on the nucleolus and the central game , 1971 .

[37]  M. Pauly.  Clubs, Commonality, and the Core: An Integration of Game Theory and the Theory of Public Goods , 1967 .

[38]  Z. Galil.  The nucleolus in games with major and minor players , 1974 .

[39]  E. Savas.  On Equity in Providing Public Services , 1978 .

[40]  Howard Raiffa,et al.  Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey. , 1958 .

[41]  J. Mossin,et al.  Merger Agreements: Some Game-Theoretic Considerations , 1968 .

[42]  Andrew Whinston,et al.  A new theory of pricing and decision- making for public investment , 1971 .

[43]  David L. Bradford,et al.  Optimal Departures from Marginal Cost Pricing , 1970 .

[44]  A. J. Goldman,et al.  The dependence of inspection-system performance on levels of penalties and inspection resources , 1976 .

[45]  Abraham Charnes,et al.  Complements, mollifiers and the propensity to disrupt , 1978 .

[46]  R. Spinetto.  Solution Concepts of N-Person Cooperative Games as Points in the Game Space , 1971 .

[47]  Louis J. Billera,et al.  Internal Telephone Billing Rates - A Novel Application of Non-Atomic Game Theory , 1978, Oper. Res..

[48]  Henry Hamburger,et al.  N‐person Prisoner's Dilemma† , 1973 .

[49]  P. Straffin,et al.  Game theory and the tennessee valley authority , 1981 .

[50]  L. Shapley,et al.  PURE COMPETITION, COALITIONAL POWER, AND FAIR DIVISION* , 1969 .

[51]  James C. Loughlin.  The efficiency and equity of cost allocation methods for multipurpose water projects , 1977 .

[52]  Lawrence Jeffrey Callen.  Financial cost allocations: a game-theoretic approach , 1977 .

[53]  S. C. Littlechild,et al.  A further note on the nucleoous of the “airport game” , 1976 .

[54]  L. S. Shapley,et al.  Geometric Properties of the Kernel, Nucleolus, and Related Solution Concepts , 1979, Math. Oper. Res..

[55]  L. Shapley,et al.  Values of Non-Atomic Games , 1974 .

[56]  J. Wiseman.  THE THEORY OF PUBLIC UTILITY PRICE—AN EMPTY BOX , 1957 .

[57]  C. G. Bird,et al.  On cost allocation for a spanning tree: A game theoretic approach , 1976, Networks.

[58]  Robert E. Verrecchia,et al.  The Shapley Value as Applied to Cost Allocation: A Reinterpretation , 1979 .

[59]  Andrew Whinston,et al.  A Game Theoretic Approach to Peak Load Pricing , 1976 .

[60]  Louis J. Billera,et al.  Cores of Nonatomic Linear Production Games , 1981, Math. Oper. Res..

[61]  Modules in applied mathematics. Vol 2: Political and related models: S.J. Brams, W.F. Lucas and P.D. Straffin (Editors) Berlin-Heidelberg-New York: Springer-Verlag 1983, 396 pages, D.M. 72 , 1983 .

[62]  Ronald H. Coase,et al.  The Marginal Cost Controversy , 1946 .

[63]  Robert E. Verrecchia.  A question of equity : use of the Shapely value to allocate state and local franchise and income taxes / BEBR No. 569 , 1979 .

[64]  Andrew B. Whinston,et al.  An Axiomatic Approach to Cost Allocation for Public Investment , 1974 .

[65]  Nimrod Megiddo,et al.  Computational Complexity of the Game Theory Approach to Cost Allocation for a Tree , 1978, Math. Oper. Res..

[66]  M. Shubik.  Game theory in the social sciences: Concepts and solutions , 1982 .

[67]  S. C. Littlechild,et al.  The propensity to disrupt and the disruption nucleolus of a characteristic function game , 1976 .

[68]  Alvin E. Roth,et al.  Subsolutions and the Supercore of Cooperative Games , 1976, Math. Oper. Res..

[69]  Gerald R. Faulhaber,et al.  Cross-Subsidization: Pricing in Public Enterprises , 1975 .

[70]  Daniel J. Kleitman,et al.  Cost allocation for a spanning tree , 1973, Networks.

[71]  W. F. Lucas,et al.  Games with No Solutions and Empty Cores , 1982, Math. Oper. Res..

[72]  J. Neumann,et al.  Theory of games and economic behavior , 1945, 100 Years of Math Milestones.