ð ð Abstract ð ð Except ð for ð a ð patina ð of ð twenty�괂Ġfirst ð century ð modernity, ð in ð the ð form ð of ð logic ð and ð language, ð philosophy ð is ð exactly ð the ð same ð now ð as ð it ð ever ð was; ð it ð has ð made ð no ð progress ð whatsoever. ð ð We ð philosophers ð wrestle ð with ð the ð exact ð same ð problems ð the ð Pre�괂Ġ Socratics ð wrestled ð with. ð ð Even ð more ð outrageous ð than ð this ð claim, ð though, ð is ð the ð blatant ð denial ð of ð its ð obvious ð truth ð by ð many ð practicing ð philosophers. ð The ð No�괂ĠProgress ð view ð is ð explored ð and ð argued ð for ð here. ð Its ð denial ð is ð diagnosed ð as ð a ð form ð of ð anosognosia, ð a ð mental ð condition ð where ð the ð affected ð person ð denies ð there ð is ð any ð problem. ð ð The ð theories ð of ð two ð eminent ð philosophers ð supporting ð the ð No�괂ĠProgress ð view ð are ð also ð examined. ð ð The ð final ð section ð offers ð an ð explanation ð for ð philosophy's ð inability ð to ð solve ð any ð philosophical ð problem, ð ever. ð ð The ð paper ð closes ð with ð some ð reflections ð on ð philosophy's ð future. ð ð ð 1. ð How ð Philosophy ð is ð like ð Science ð ð I'm ð a ð professor ð in ð a ð philosophy ð department. ð ð Most ð of ð my ð philosophical ð colleagues ð study ð ethics ð of ð one ð sort ð or ð another. ð ð We ð have ð in ð our ð department ð several ð consequentialists, ð a ð couple ð of ð deontologists ð and ð moral ð essentialists, ð a ð couple ð of ð virtue ð ethicists, ð and ð a ð few ð relativists. ð ð It ð is ð a ð commonplace ð that ð these ð views, ð at ð least ð in ð certain ð well�괂Ġknown ð formulations, ð are ð incompatible ð with ð each ð other. ð Certainly, ð most ð of ð my ð colleagues ð believe ð this. ð Most ð also ð believe ð that ð he ð or ð she ð is ð right. ð ð Since ð they ð also ð believe ð in ð theory�괂Ġincompatiablism, ð they ð believe ð that ð their ð colleagues ð are ð wrong. ð ð The ð consequentialists ð (a ð group ð to ð which ð I ð do ð not ð belong) ð are ð particularly ð
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