The complexity of election problems with group-separable preferences

We analyze the complexity of several NP-hard election-related problems under the assumptions that the voters have group-separable preferences. We show that under this assumption our problems typically remain NP-hard, but we provide more efficient algorithms if additionally the clone decomposition tree is of moderate height.

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