A Braess type paradox in power control over interference channels

The original Braess paradox has been predicted in a context of Wardrop equilibrium in a road traffic context where there is a continuum of (non-atomic) players. It was shown that the performance of all users at equilibrium becomes worse when adding a route. This paradox as well as various variants were also studied in the context of computer networks and telecommunications. We identify a new type of paradox occurring in wireless communications with some unusual properties with respect to previous models in which the paradox has been identified.

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