论文信息 - Know-How Disclosure and Incomplete Contracts

Know-How Disclosure and Incomplete Contracts

When two parties invest in human capital and at the same time decide on know-how disclosure it can be shown that joint ownership with veto power is the optimal ownership structure, given that only incomplete contracts can be written.

Patrick W. Schmitz | Stephanie Rosenkranz | S. Rosenkranz | P. Schmitz

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